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Abstract. Bitcoin and blockchain in general is a hot topic nowa-
days. In the paper we propose a quantum empowering of this technol-
ogy and show how to speed-up the mining procedure using the modified
Grover’s algorithm.
1. Introduction
Quantum computing is a hot modern topic of Theoretical Computer Science.
Theoretical research in this area started in the last decades of previous century.
Yuri Manin and Richard Feynman were one of the first famous researchers who
proposed this area of research in 1980s. Recent results in quantum computa-
tions and quantum technology achievements brought theoretical results to the
practice. The appearance of so-called IBM-Q device created a new quantum
computer science community and gave it a tool to verify the known theoretical
ideas and algorithms.
Another hot area in applied computer science is the blockchain technology.
Clearly, that it will be interesting to check out what opportunities can quantum
computation theory and quantum technology give to the blockchain technology.
For instance, there were several proposals on empowering Bitcoin Electronic
Cash System with quantum technologies (see, e.g. [1, 2, 3]), as well as on
possible attacks on this system [4].
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In this paper we consider the natural idea of applying Grover’s quantum
search algorithm to the general blockchain technology (for mining). So, the
paper is devoted to developing and testing this idea for the blockchain tech-
nology.
2. Preliminaries
In the classical case, the complexity of searching in an unstructured data
set of size n is O(n), e.g., in the worst case, we have to look through all the
records. The well-known Grover’s algorithm [5] allows to solve this problem in
O(
√
n) steps. Thus, if we have 40 bits and we need to find a combination that
satisfies certain condition, then in the classical case we need to process about
1 000 000 000 000 different combinations, whereas the quantum algorithm will
yield a result in about 1 000 000 queries. We briefly recall the structure of the
algorithm.
We have a register of n qubits that are in the uniform superposition of the
basis states, i.e. we have all possible 2n states, the amplitude of each state is
1/
√
2n (the sum of the squares of the modules will give 1).
We also have one additional qubit, which we will call functional, and the
function is an oracle. The oracle translates the functional qubit from the state
|0〉 to the state |1〉, if all the other qubits state encodes the item that we are
looking for.
In order to get exactly the state that corresponds to the oracle function, we
start with changing the sign of the amplitude of the desired value to negative
(to do this we translate the functional qubit into the state |1〉 on all sets, then
apply the Hadamard gate to it and apply the oracle function to the whole
register).
After the sign of the target amplitude has changed, the average value has
dropped below the average value of the amplitudes.
The next step is the Grover diffusion operator, that makes the value of
the sought-for state’s amplitude higher than to the others. Performing this
procedure about O(
√
2n) times will make the desired amplitude close to unity.
3. Quantum-Assisted Blockchain
Since quantum computers can perform an exhaustive search quadratically
faster than classical computers, we can use the modified Grover’s algorithms
to perform mining on a quantum computer. Indeed, if we can consider all the
values of nonce at once, then we can speed up the search for the right one.
To implement this idea, we start with dividing our quantum register into
several parts: nonce (we apply the Hadamard transform to these qubits and we
will consider all possible values at once), hash (there will be corresponding hash
values), service qubits (for implementing basic operations) and a functional
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The algorithm itself consists of the following steps:
(1) We apply the Hadamard transform to the nonce qubits and calculate
the hash value for all of the nonce values at once (we need to implement
a quantum procedure for the SHA-3 hashing algorithm here);
(2) For each block of the incoming message (block header in the blockchain),
we first mix it with the hash state (in the SHA-3 terms), and then com-
pute the hash function. We get a register that contains all values of
nonce, hash values for each nonce, a number of service qubits that
are needed to temporarily store the intermediate computations and a
functional qubit;
(3) We use the oracle function to calculate a hash value that is below
a certain threshold. This function is a NOT operation controlled by
those qubits whose value is intended to be zero in the desired hash
value;
(4) Apply the Grover’s algorithm to find the desired hash value and nonce.
3.1. Implementation of logical operations using quantum transforma-
tions. To implement classical hashing algorithms on a quantum computer, it
is sufficient to show how to implement the following set of primitives – XOR,
AND, NOT and bitwise shift.
XOR is implemented using the CNOT gate. But in the case of a hash, we
would not like to write the result to one of the operands, thereby erasing its
value. To write the result of an XOR operation into a separate qubit, one have
to:
(1) Initialize the service qubit in the state |0〉;
(2) Perform a CNOT gate, in which the first operand is the controlling
one, and the service qubit is a target;
(3) Perform the same transformation, but with the second operand as the
controlling one.
Thus, the service qubit will be in the state |1〉 if and only if exactly one
of the operands is 1, otherwise it will be |0〉. And this is exactly the XOR
operation.
AND is implemented using the three-bit gate CCNOT – it inverts the target
qubit only when the first two are in state |1〉.
NOT is implemented by a simple Pauli gate X.
Bit shift can be implemented using series of swap transformations (qubit
exchange).
3.2. Problems of using Grover algorithm for mining. The proposed al-
gorithm has to deal with the following issues.
Too low value of the average. Grover’s algorithm works efficiently only if we
have a uniform superposition of all the qubits participating in it. But in our
case we put only the first n qubits of nonce into the superposition, and the
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remainingm qubits contain the corresponding values of the hash function. This
means that instead of 2n+m different states, we have only 2n, the remaining
states have zero amplitudes. This means that the average value is not close to
the amplitude (1/
√
2n, but closer to 0, because when calculating the average,
the sum of all the amplitudes is divided by the total number of states.
Therefore, after the first Grover diffusion operator all amplitudes go to neg-
ative values, which does not allow Grover’s algorithm to be used further.
The increase in the zero amplitudes. If we consider not the entire quantum reg-
ister, but only the block that corresponds to a certain value of nonce, then we
see an incomplete distribution – only one amplitude is nonzero (it corresponds
to the value of the hash function with this nonce value), the other amplitudes
will be 0. Full distribution for nonce 00 . . . 0:
a0|00 . . . 0 00 . . . 0〉+ a1|00 . . . 0 00 . . . 1〉+ · · · + am|00 . . . 0 11 . . . 1〉.
Incomplete distribution for nonce 00 . . . 0:
0|00 . . . 0 00 . . . 0〉+ 1|00 . . . 0 00 . . . 1〉+ · · ·+ 0|00 . . . 0 11 . . . 1〉.
That is, the value of nonce 00 . . . 0 corresponds to the single value of hash –
00 . . . 1, all other states can not be met.
This helps the oracle – it “marks” a state with a non-zero amplitude only
if it satisfies the condition. The remaining states, even if they will satisfy the
condition, will not be labeled, since they have a zero amplitude.
But this advantage will vanish immediately after the first application of
the Grover diffusion operator – we make the same transformations over all
states simultaneously, and so the zero amplitudes are also inverted and will be
nonzero.
The possible existence of many solutions. Grover’s algorithm increases the am-
plitude only when applied certain number of times, afterwards the reverse effect
begins. This can be compared with the rotation of a vector – it is rotated sev-
eral times by a certain angle and as soon as it passes the desired position, the
vector starts to move away.
We know the exact number of iterations of the Grover algorithm for the
maximal success probability, but this number is calculated for the case when
the solution is unique. In our case, there can be many such solutions, and
therefore we do not know exactly how many times the Grover iteration should
be applied.
The main problems arise from the fact that if we consider the registers nonce
and hash together, then we have an incomplete distribution. To solve the first
2 problems, it is sufficient to switch to the full register, and this can be done
very easily – by making the hash computation part of the oracle.
Indeed, if we apply the Grover algorithm only to the nonce register, and the
hash register is used only for the oracle function to work, then at the end of
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the algorithm we can easily get the hash value for the found nonce. This will
just add one hash computation to the algorithm.
But it is impossible to implement the Grover algorithm only on the nonce
register without additional transformations. And the thing is that we entangle
the qubits from the nonce register with the hash register during the computa-
tion. And this means that the simple application of the Grover algorithm in
our case is impossible.
The solution to the problem is the inverting of all service qubits to the initial
state. All of the qubits that are not used in the Grover algorithm are to be
transformed to the initial state – |0〉. In our case, after evaluating the value
of hash, the nonce register becomes entangled with the hash register, which
in turn is entangled with the service register. All these connections must be
broken each time before applying the Grover diffusion operator.
Thus, the algorithm now has the following steps:
(1) Transform the nonce register to the uniform superposition state;
(2) Compute the hash value for all of the nonce values using quantum
parallelism. The result will be in the hash register;
(3) Apply the oracle function to the hash register to find out which nonce
values give the hash that is below a certain threshold;
(4) Apply the reverse hash computation procedure to “unwind” all the
qubits except for nonce and functional qubits to the initial basis state
|0〉;
(5) Apply the Grover diffusion operator to the nonce register;
(6) Repeat steps 2–5 as many times as necessary.
The solution to the third problem is in adjustment of the complexity of the
network.
As mentioned above, the Grover algorithm is efficient if there is a unique
solution that satisfies the conditions. But the same problem arises also for the
classic miner – the PoW consensus assumes the presence of a certain threshold
for the value of hash. In the classical case, this allows us to adjust the time of
mining of one block.
In our case, this will reduce the probability of having more than one suitable
value.
We have an n-qubit nonce register and an m-qubit hash register. For exam-
ple, in bitcoin, these values are 32 and 256, respectively. But since the power of
a set of nonce is many times smaller than the set of hash values, we can come
up against the situation that after having gone over all the values of nonce we
did not get the hash, which satisfies our conditions. In such cases, it is allowed
to extend the time or change the transaction and try again. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we can extend the length of the nonce to 48 bits.
We expect the probability of a single correct solution to be close to 1/2,
the total number of solutions is 2256, we divide it into 248 different sets. The
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probability that we have one correct solution is the number of correct solutions
divided by the number of different sets. From the equation 2x/2256−48 = 1/2
we get that we must have 2207 different solutions, so the first 49 bits in the
desired values of the hash should be 0. And this practically coincides with the
current level of complexity of the bitcoin network! Hence, we need 48 qubits for
nonce and 256 qubits for the hash value to implement the complexity threshold
of the bitcoin network.
3.3. Comparative time analysis of the speed of the classical and quan-
tum mining algorithms. According to Intel’s measurements, the average
four-core classic computer at 3 GHz processes about 7 million hashing opera-
tions per second.
According to measurements, one gate per quantum computer requires about
1 nanosecond. And this is 1 billion gates per second.
To handle our 48-bit nonce, the classic computer will have to execute about
248 hashing operations. Given the speed of 7 million operations per second, we
get an estimate of the required time – about 40 million seconds, which is 11,000
hours or 465 days. It roughly converges with the current reality of bitcoin –
all network majors in the world find the right value in 10 minutes.
A quantum algorithm requires pi
√
2n/4 operations. This is about 13 million
operations, and this, considering the same processing speed, is only 2 seconds!
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